Why Are Russians Indifferent to the Syrian Conflict?

Sergei Davidis is a Russian opposition politician and
rights defender. He is a member of the council
of Memorial Human Rights Center, and a member of the
Federal Coordination Council of the 5th of December
Party.
SyriaUntold sat down with him to understand how
Russian civil society positions itself on the Syrian
conflict. This dialogue is the outcome of a partnership
between SyriaUntold and openDemocracy Russia (oDR) ,
and is republished here as part of Global Voices’ own
partnership with SyriaUntold.
SyriaUntold: Syrian civilians have been subjected to
unprecedented violence for more than six years. Why
is Russian civil society silent about it? Are there
underreported solidarity initiatives?
Davidis: I don’t think there are any
particularly significant solidarity initiatives
that the world doesn’t know about.
Sometimes there are solitary pickets,
sometimes there are slogans of solidarity
at general opposition demonstrations —
particularly those regarding Ukraine.
After the Kremlin decided to deploy troops
in Syria [in 2015], there was a
demonstration against it [in Moscow], two
to three thousand people attended. There
was an attempt to hold a solidarity
demonstration at the height of the storm of
Aleppo in November 2016 — this had a
certain resonance in society, but the city
authorities didn’t allow it to go ahead. Back
then, there were some protest actions in a
few Russian cities, although they didn’t get
much in the way of numbers. There’s some
solidarity with the Syrian people on Russian
social networks, but it’s quite quiet.
The reasons why Russian society is silent
on this issue are complex, and probably
can’t be explained exhaustively. I suspect
that the following factors are at play:
– the coverage of the situation in Syria by
media outlets under state control. If this
coverage mentions violence against
civilians, then it will be acts of violence
committed by IS [also known as ISIS,
Islamic State, or Daesh] or the [US-led]
Coalition. Russia is presented as the
defender of the civilian population;
– the conflict in Syria doesn’t fit into the
dichotomy of the battle between the
democratic west and the autocratic Putin
regime;
– the general lack of information on the
situation in Syria, and the complexity of this
situation for Russian citizens — to figure
out what is going on, especially on the
basis of fragmentary and unbalanced
information, and therefore understand who
should be supported and why, is very
difficult;
– the Syrian context itself is culturally alien
and incomprehensible for Russian citizens
(in contrast to Ukraine), and the level of
empathy for the Syrian people is low;
– the threat of Islamic terrorism and, in
first place, Islamic State, is seen as real,
and the Russian public finds it hard to
distinguish the fight against IS and other
military conflicts in Syria.
Sergei Davidis. Photo from the 5th of December
Party.
SyriaUntold: What about the Russian opposition to the
current government? Where does it stand on the
Syrian conflict?
Davidis: The real opposition to the Russian
authorities — the non-system opposition —
views Putin’s war in Syria negatively. This
concerns the so-called “liberal” opposition
too, as well as a considerable section of
the Russian nationalist opposition and the
Russian left. But the main theses of
Russian opposition groups are pragmatic
rather than humane — Russia is using funds
for a distant and unnecessary war, funds
that are needed to solve the numerous
internal problems at home.
Nevertheless, the idea that the Putin
regime is waging war in Syria to support
Bashar Al-Asad, to oppose the west and
satisfy his own geopolitical ambitions,
rather than really confronting IS and other
terrorist groups, is seen as more or less
self-evident by the opposition.
SyriaUntold: Is indifference towards Syria somehow
related to the poor status of civil liberties in
today's Russia?
Davidis: It’s difficult to judge the
connection between the two exactly. But
there’s definitely something. At a minimum,
the numerous problems with rights and
freedoms in Russia suck up a lot of time
from the section of Russian society that is,
in principle, ready to express its concern
with these domestic issues, which doesn’t
leave energy for problems taking place far
from Russia. Moreover, the constant
limitations on freedom of assembly and
expression make getting your position
across to the rest of society all the more
difficult.
SyriaUntold: To what extent can apathy towards the
Syrian cause be ascribed to general indifference
towards remote conflicts and to what extent is it a
signal of widespread support for the Russian
government’s policies in Syria?
Davidis: Both factors are present here, but
to understand their contribution, a
comparison with the annexation of Crimea
and aggression towards Ukraine is telling.
According to polls, these actions by the
Russian authorities had far more support
from society. However, the protest against
state aggression and solidarity with the
Ukrainian people was significantly more
noticeable in Russian society. So, in terms
of Syria, support for the Russian authorities’
actions is extremely passive. Indeed, it is
precisely indifference to a distant, foreign
and incredibly complex conflict that is key
here.
SyriaUntold: To what extent are reliable and
diversified sources of information on Syria available in
Russian in the country? What is the general perception
of the Russian media’s coverage of Syria? What about
the prevailing view on how western media are
covering the conflict?
Davidis: It’s hard to say, at least in Russia,
what sources of information about events in
Syria are absolutely reliable. But of course,
it’s impossible to talk about diversification
of information resources in Russia. In
official media, which are more or less the
main source of information for the majority
of Russian citizens, the coverage is purely
propagandistic and prejudiced. In the few
oppositional media and the internet,
diversification comes down to refuting
official information, drawing attention to the
Russian casualties, expenditure of funds on
the war, foreign policy and military failures
of Putin and Assad, rather than an attempt
to paint a real, holistic picture of what’s
going on in Syria.
The picture of the Syrian conflict, which
you can see in the mainstream western
press, is practically inaccessible to the
Russian viewer — the kind of information
paradigm (not only in its relationship to
Syria, but in terms of attention paid) isn’t
available in Russian, including in opposition
media. The picture you see in Russia’s
official and pro-government media is
principally different, opposite, from its
western counterpart — and it’s the same in
the alternative press.
SyriaUntold: Is there any Syrian civil actor,
intellectual, or artist who has managed to reach the
Russian audience? Because of the historical relations
between the Assad regime and the USSR-Russia, a
significant number of Syrians have lived in Russia,
and some of them even speak Russian fluently. What
is the role of this Russophone Syrian community in
Russia and abroad? Does it have any impact on how
the narrative on Syria is shaped in Russia?
Davidis: I can’t think of any successful
examples where Syrians have appealed to
the Russian public, or any role played by
Russian-speaking Syrians. The only
instance I can think of is, perhaps, the
statements made by Muhammed Fares, the
first Syrian cosmonaut. Fares, who
conducted a mission on the Mir space
station in 1987, joined the opposition in
2012 and eventually fled to Turkey. In
November 2015, Fares called on the
Russian people to support the fight against
Assad — and this had a certain resonance
in society.
SyriaUntold: Some have argued that Islamophobia has
played a role in decreasing empathy for the Syrian
cause (especially in comparison with the Ukrainian
cause). If so, do Russians look at Syria in the same
way they look at Chechnya, therefore sharing the
same prejudices on an allegedly Islamic cause? What
about Russian Muslims? Are they vocal about Syria or
is mobilization limited to Islamist hardliners?
Davidis: I don’t think that Islamophobia is
crucial to understanding the indifference of
Russian citizens to Syria. It plays a certain
role. Society doesn’t want to understand
the internal confrontations or waste energy
on distinguishing IS terrorists and other
groups fighting in Syria, thereby risking the
possibility of being wrong.
But a comparison with Chechnya shows
that Islamophobia isn’t key. The level of
empathy for the Chechen people during the
first and even second Chechen wars was
far higher. This was probably connected to
the geographical, cultural and historical
closeness of Chechnya (and the casualties,
terror attacks, mass involvement in military
actions from across Russia, and because
the war was so physically close).
I’m not well informed enough about how
Russian Muslims feel about this situation,
but what I do know tells me that their
positions are defined by their relationship to
the Russian authorities. Supporters of the
regime tend to support its position,
including Syria, whereas opponents are
more likely to sympathize with IS. But as
far as I know, there’s been no actions in
support of Syrian civilians, actions against
Asad or Russia’s role in the war, by
Russian Muslims.
SyriaUntold: In Europe, siding with the Syrian regime
has become a common trend among wide segments of
the traditional left (under the guise of “anti-
imperialism”) and the far right-wing (for Islamophobic
reasons and in the hope of curbing the unwanted
waves of refugees through stable “secular”
dictatorships). A growing number of decision-makers
are also rehabilitating the Assad regime under the
pretext that, in their view, it’s the lesser of two evils
(the latter being Sunni jihadism) and its collaboration
is helpful in restabilizing global security. Are there any
similarities with the Russian political landscape and,
if not, how does it differ from Europe with regards to
Syria?
Davidis: The Russian authorities, and the
“experts” and media who support them, use
elements of similar rhetoric. But with the
absence of public politics and public
discussion in the western understanding,
these arguments remain instruments of
building support for the authorities’ actions,
rather than a subject of substantive political
and civic debate.
The support for the Assad regime and the
military operation in Syria is based on the
public position of the Russian authorities,
which is passively shared by a significant
section of Russian society. This position
can be explained as follows:
– This support is the most effective and
natural means of fighting IS and terrorist
groups like it, and a chance to stop them
far from Russia’s borders;
– The Assad regime, which is a legal,
democratically elected regime that is
realizing Syria’s sovereignty, defending it
against external aggression, international
terrorism and color revolutions from
outside, is legally and morally justified;
– Participation in the military operation in
Syria, the support and maintenance of a
friendly regime in the Middle East allows
Russia to oppose its geopolitical enemy —
the west, and, in particular, the US, as well
as to show the might and importance of
Russia, test new military equipment, and
give practical military experience to the
Russian army.
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